Putin’s war economy has a weakness, and Ukrainian special ops are hammering it

 Last weekend marked a significant shift in the maritime war between Ukraine and Russia. On 28 November, two Russian shadow-fleet tankers were disabled by Ukrainian Sea Baby drones in the southern Black Sea, the furthest south Kyiv has ever struck directly. The Gambia-flagged Kairos (274 m, 25 crew) was hit 28 nautical miles off Turkey’s Kocaeli province; explosions breached the hull and started a fire that forced the crew to abandon ship. Hours later the Virat, also Gambia-flagged and sanctioned, took a hit 35 nautical miles offshore, disabling the engine room. While the crew made repairs, the ship was struck again. Both ships were empty and heading to Novorossiysk to load sanctioned crude; both are now believed to be out of service. Overnight, a third strike crippled a key mooring buoy at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal in Novorossiysk, halting Kazakh oil flows and disrupting roughly one per cent of global supply.

The Sea Baby drones are slightly bigger than the famous Magura V5 and in this latest round of attacks, by the time you factor in transit distance, loitering time, target identification and tracking, course to intercept and the ability to remain undetected and unjammed, are clearly now an exceptionally serious capability. Some estimates put their maximum operating range at 700 nautical miles, more than enough to cover the whole of the Black Sea, carrying a payload of up to 2,000kgs; both specs are far in excess of their battle proven predecessor. These latest strikes appear to have been carried out by the SBU security service, the Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy – an organisation with no real equivalent in the UK which often carries out tasks we would give to our special forces.

The Black Sea campaign has evolved in stages since February 2022: initial Russian blockade and Snake Island seizure; Ukrainian counter-offensives that sank the cruiser Moskva and recaptured the island; the rise of uncrewed surface vessels that pushed the Russian fleet out of western Sea; the 2023-24 reopening of the grain corridor; and what looked like a special forces limpet mining campaign earlier this year that targeted five separate vessels, all of whom had visited Russian ports. Is this latest round of attacks, executed at increased range from the Ukrainian coast, the opening of a sixth phase: direct economic warfare against Russia’s dark fleet network?

Just prior to the two Black Sea strikes, a third tanker – the 50,000 ton Panama-flagged Mersin, owned by Turkey’s Mersin Shipping – suffered blasts and a flooded engine room off Dakar, Senegal. Anchored there since late September with its last AIS signal on 23 November, the vessel (carrying Russian refined products to Africa and South America) received a full Senegalese response: tugs, navy personnel and anti-pollution barriers to avert a spill, with all crew safely rescued. Though unclaimed and unconfirmed as a Ukrainian operation, it never takes long for people to join the dots and speculation to that effect has been rife. Theories as to how the possible attack was carried out range from logistically complex to fantastical. Suffice it to say, if by the end of this war, Ukraine hasn’t started to make use of its own merchant fleet to launch attacks from, I will be surprised.

Maritime theatres, although occasionally overlooked, always underpin the land war. Ukraine’s pre-war grain exports (worth around 20 billion pounds in 2021) and Russia’s Caspian crude both flow through the Black Sea. Control of the sea determines who can feed armies, pay soldiers and keep the lights on. The liberation of Snake Island in 2022 eased pressure on Mykolaiv and Kherson; the retreat of Putin’s Black Sea Fleet in 2023–24 allowed Odesa’s ports to resume near-normal operations.

Russia has responded by striking at Odesa and the Danube river ports, yet Ukrainian exports along the western corridor are now running at pre-war levels. In practical terms, Kyiv has regained freedom of navigation. Moscow has not.

The shadow, or dark fleet – hundreds of ageing, unsafe, often uninsured tankers flying flags of convenience – has become the main channel for Russian oil sold above the G7’s price cap. The price-cap mechanism, introduced in December 2022, was meant to limit this revenue while keeping oil flowing; in practice it has been widely circumvented. The system has now become so easy to get around it has become largely ineffective. A recent RUSI report says the cap “has produced major unintended consequences: the rise of a rapidly expanding shadow fleet and a global cat-and-mouse game to target these shady vessels. Yet despite repeated sanctions against individual vessels or intermediaries, Russian export volumes remain largely stable” before concluding, “rather than relying on half-measures like the price cap, Ukraine’s allies should simply ban G7 services for Russian oil.”

These same ships pose a growing environmental risk. Most are poorly maintained and operate with sub-standard crews. Collisions, groundings and fires have multiplied. So far this has been an “out of sight, out of mind” issue, as with so much to do with shipping. However, there isn’t anyone in the industry who doesn’t think that sooner or later there will be an accident so large that it cannot be ignored. It’s just a question of where and when. And if the ship or ships are uninsured, who is going to foot the billion pound clean-up bill?

There is also an interesting article to be penned on the legal difference between targeting merchant vessels sustaining Putin’s war effort – typically so far with no lives lost – and the US striking boats who might be smuggling drugs – usually killing people in the process. The difference in lethality is largely down to the different types of craft being struck. This is one for another time, probably when I’ve consulted a lawyer.

Ukraine has made exceptional use of innovative technology, adapted its doctrine and shifted tactics multiple times during this war – all with a view to imposing a cost on Russia whilst ensuring its own trade is free to flow. In the maritime sphere they have dominated Putin’s forces despite having far less in the way of resources.

Meanwhile, the UK, EU, US etc stick rigidly to a sanctions regime set up in 2022 that isn’t really working now and are forever constrained by a set of boarding criteria that means we can’t even jump onboard these ships and see what they’re up to. It’s no wonder Ukraine keeps looking for new ways to do the job itself.